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This paper makes three diverse contributions. First, whereas the extant litera-
ture estimates a single elasticity of substitution/complementarity from an
input distance function, we calculate a range of elasticities. Second, we make a
substantive contribution to the literature on bank input substitution/comple-
mentarity because somewhat surprisingly there has been very little work on
this issue. Third, our analysis of the substitutability/complementarity of
deposit types for U.S. banks in 2008–2015 (crisis and beyond), vis-à-vis
1992–2007 (pre-crisis), is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to consider the
effect of structural change on elasticities of substitution/complementarity. To
account for the extent of the heterogeneity in the U.S. banking industry we
estimate random coefficients models, as opposed to standard fixed parameter
models. The key empirical findings are the changes in the substitutability/
complementarity of the quantities of particular pairs of deposit types between
the two sample periods, which points to changes in depositors' preferences
across banks' deposit portfolios. To illustrate, for savings deposits, which are
characterized by flexibility and liquidity, and time deposits, which are less so
and thus have higher interest rates, we find significantly lower quantity com-
plementarity in 2008–2015. From this finding, we can conclude that savings
and time deposits have become more distinct, which we suggest should be
reflected in banks' strategic management of their deposit portfolios.
KEYWORD S
bank strategy and decision-making, deposit types, financial crisis, input substitution/
complementarity, U.S. banks
1 | INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis was a watershed as it marked the
beginning of a period of great change that involved vari-
ous policies and reforms to moderate the resulting Great
Recession and reduce the risk of a similar crisis in the
future. Among other things, during this period there
were marked changes in depositors' preferences across
U.S. banks' deposit portfolios. This is evident from
Figure 1, which presents for the U.S. banking system for
1992–2015 three disaggregations of real total deposits into
different deposit categories.1 To illustrate, panel B of this
figure reveals that savings deposits increased sharply
since the crisis circa 2008, while time deposits have
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declined steadily. Here we analyse this and other crisis-
induced changes in depositors' preferences, and such an
analysis can be used to inform the deposit management
of U.S. banks. In the next section, we motivate our analy-
sis by discussing the crisis-induced U.S. banking system
developments in the context of the roles they may have
played in the changing relationships between deposit cat-
egories. Since in the intermediation approach to banking
(Sealey & Lindley, 1977) deposits are viewed as inputs in
the production process of the banking firm, we approach
our analysis from the perspective of changes in input
elasticities of substitution and complementarity for pairs
of deposit types.
Rather than calculate elasticities of substitution and
complementarity from a cost function, which is common
in the literature (e.g., Athanasios, Ray, & Miller, 1990;
Berndt & Wood, 1975; Michaelides, Tsionas, Vouldis, &
Konstantakis, 2015), we calculate these elasticities from
an input distance function (IDF). In contrast to the multi-
ple input and single output production function, the IDF
technology is in terms of multiple inputs being used to
produce multiple outputs. To analyse changes in deposit
type substitution/complementarity, we must estimate an
IDF because although our data set for U.S. banks is
extremely rich, input price data is not available for all the
deposit types in Figure 1 for a cost function analysis.
Directly from a fitted IDF therefore we obtain primal
elasticities of complementarity, which measure the
degree of substitutability/complementarity between the
quantities of a pair of inputs. Having estimated an IDF
and without the need to estimate its dual cost function,
by drawing on this duality and following some simple
rearranging we obtain dual elasticities of substitution,
which measure the degree of price substitutability/com-
plementarity between a pair of inputs. In other words,
dual elasticities of substitution that we would obtain
directly from a cost function are obtained indirectly from
an IDF. Additionally, as the rate of interest on a deposit
type is taken to be the price paid by a bank to attract
deposits, by obtaining dual elasticities of substitution
indirectly from an IDF we circumvent the non-standard
case of non-interest-bearing deposits whose price is zero,
which from panel C of Figure 1 we can see is a non-
negligible deposit category.
Our paper makes three diverse contributions. The
first involves extending the study by Stern (2010), who
derives the shadow elasticity of complementarity and
shows how to calculate it from a fitted IDF. In contrast,
instead of estimating a single elasticity of substitution/
complementarity from an IDF, to foster comparisons we
demonstrate how to compute a wider range of elasticities,
which are a mix of symmetric and asymmetric elastici-
ties.2 Our analysis also reaffirms the importance of the
long-established theoretical literature on elasticities of
substitution and complementarity for applications to con-
temporary issues in banking and other areas. We com-
pute the following six elasticities of substitution and
complementarity, which we present and discuss in detail
in due course: (a) Antonelli elasticity of complementarity
(AEC); (b) Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution (AES);
(c) Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES);
(d) Morishima elasticity of complementarity (MEC);
FIGURE 1 Different disaggregations of annual real deposits
in the U.S. banking system
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(e) shadow elasticity of substitution (SES); and (f)
shadow elasticity of complementarity (SEC), where the
extant literature focuses on calculating only the SEC from
an IDF. To calculate these six elasticities we adopt a sche-
matic approach that is based on the AEC because from
the AEC we obtain the AES, MEC and SEC, and from
the AES we calculate the SES and the MES.
We calculate a wide range of elasticities of substitu-
tion and complementarity because different elasticity
measures provide different information. To illustrate, an
AEC or MEC (both of which are obtained directly from
the IDF and are therefore primal elasticities) >0 (<0)
indicates that two inputs are quantity, q, complements
(substitutes). An AES or MES (both of which are
obtained indirectly from the IDF and are therefore dual
elasticities) >0 (<0) indicates that two inputs are price, p,
substitutes (complements).3 The SEC and the SES, on the
other hand, measure the degree of difficulty of
q substitution and p substitution, respectively
(Stern, 2011). This raises the issue of what information
we are most interested in. For our purposes, we are par-
ticularly interested in the AEC and AES and to a lesser
extent the MEC and MES. This is because based on a
point Stern (2011) makes about the appropriateness of
the Morishima measures depending on the number of
inputs in the analysis, the Allen-Uzawa measures are
more relevant to our empirical setting (see the applica-
tion for further discussion of this).
Furthermore, assuming a systematic two-stage bank
decision-making process on deposit type substitution/
complementarity, we are interested in the AEC, AES,
MEC and MES because they can be used in the first stage
to inform which deposit types are substitutes/comple-
ments. Given this knowledge, in the second stage the
SEC and SES can be used to inform how viable it is to
substitute between deposit types. As we elaborate on
next, this is in the context of the paucity of studies that
consider elasticities of substitution/complementarity for
deposit types. We therefore focus on informing the first
stage of this decision-making process, as this is the logical
approach to develop this small body of literature. We do
though report empirical estimates of the SEC and SES for
completeness and to acknowledge the role they can play
in the second stage of the process.
As we have touched on, our second contribution is to
significantly add to the literature on bank input substitu-
tion. Despite there being a prominent related literature
on bank efficiency and productivity, as well as a number
of empirical applications of elasticities of substitution/
complementarity in other areas, Athanasios et al. (1990)
and Michaelides et al. (2015) are the only studies on bank
input substitution. A legacy of the seminal application on
input substitution by Berndt and Wood (1975) is that
subsequent applications have been concentrated in the
same area and thus focus on substitution between the
energy and capital inputs in industrial production.
The prevalence of this type of application prompted the
meta-analysis of reported elasticities between energy and
capital by Koetse, de Groot, and Florax (2008).
We extend both of the above studies on bank input
substitution via our third contribution as well as by:
(a) using up-to-date data; (b) computing a lot more types
of elasticities; and (c) examining multiple rich disaggre-
gations of total deposits. In contrast, Athanasios
et al. (1990) only calculate the AES and Michaelides
et al. (2015) only compute the MES. Although the latter
is a recent study of U.S. banks the authors use data for
the period 1989–2000. This is because their focus is on
the development and demonstration of a new economet-
ric estimator of a model rather than on issues relating to
the financial crisis. Moreover, although both these stud-
ies obviously account for deposits, only the latter disag-
gregates interest-bearing deposits into a portion of panel
C in Figure 1 (interest-bearing transaction and non-
transaction accounts). We, on the other hand, analyse all
the different disaggregations of total deposits in Figure 1.
The third contribution of our paper is that, to the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to analyse the effect of
structural change on elasticities of substitution/comple-
mentarity. This is because the major developments in the
U.S. banking system in response to the crisis clearly
invoked structural change in the industry. This suggests
that there is plenty of scope for other applications of our
approach because there are a lot of cases in banking
industries where policy intervention has initiated struc-
tural change, for example, market deregulation/
liberalization.
Finally, we note for various pairs of deposit types that
a key empirical finding is the change in their
q substitutes/complements classification between the
pre-crisis period (1992–2007) and the period covering the
crisis and beyond (2008–2015). To illustrate, for the pre-
crisis period the AEC for interest-bearing and non-inter-
est-bearing deposits suggests that the quantities of these
deposit types are independent of one another. For the
period covering the crisis and beyond, however, the AEC
indicates that the quantities of these two deposit types
are substitutes, which points to a change in depositors'
preferences between these two deposit categories. In light
of such findings, an interesting area for further research
would be to examine the determinants of such changes
in preferences between deposit types.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
To set the scene, in Section 2 we discuss the crisis-
induced U.S. banking system developments in the con-
text of the roles they may have played in the changing
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relationships between deposit types. Since a modelling
framework needs to be followed to calculate the elastici-
ties of substitution and complementarity, we set out the
framework in Section 3, which consists of two parts. In
the first part, we provide an overview of the duality
between the IDF and the cost function, as we rely on this
duality to calculate the dual elasticities of substitution.
The second part discusses random coefficients modelling,
as we use this approach (rather than a standard fixed
parameter model) to estimate the IDF to better account
for the extent of the heterogeneity between U.S. banks. In
Section 4, we present the general form of the six elastici-
ties of substitution and complementarity we calculate.
Section 5 focuses on the empirical analysis of differences
in the substitutability/complementarity of deposit types
between the pre-crisis period and the period covering the
crisis and beyond. Section 6 then concludes by putting
into context some of our salient findings on deposit type
substitution and complementarity by describing some
general banking situations that fit with such findings.




We adopt a logical structure for the discussion in this
section by considering the role that U.S. banking system
developments may have played in the changing relation-
ships between the levels of deposit types in Figure 1 from
the crisis onwards. At the outset we note that total
deposits trends upwards over the period 2008–2015 (see
Figure 2). This is because, despite the impact of the crisis-
induced recession, the U.S. economy grew over this
period, and, as a result, the amount of U.S. currency in
circulation increased (Rudebusch, 2018), which will have
in part manifested itself in the form of larger deposits. To
illustrate, over this period U.S. real GDP increased by
11.47% and the U.S. monetary base (M0) increased by a
factor of 4.51. The interesting issue for our purposes is
when we compare Figures 1 and 2, we can see that there
are clear similarities/differences between the changes
since the crisis in the level of total deposits and the levels
of some deposit types. It is these similarities and differ-
ences that we focus on for the most part in the remainder
of this section.
We can see from Figure 1 that the 2008 crisis led to
very similar immediate falls in non-transaction accounts,
savings deposits and interest-bearing deposits (Panels A–
C of this figure, respectively). The similarity between
these immediate falls in the levels of these deposit types
is of course because the categories overlap (savings
deposits of course form part of non-transaction accounts
and interest-bearing deposits). Given the gravity of the
crisis, striking features of these three deposit categories
are how relatively small and short-lived were, first, their
falls in 2008 and, second, any subsequent fluctuations.
This was followed by the start of relatively stable upward
trends in all three categories over the remainder of our
study period. In the case of non-transaction accounts and
interest-bearing deposits, these upward trends closely
resembled their pre-crisis trends. In the latter portion of
our study period, however, savings deposits rose much
faster than before the crisis.
It follows from the range of policy responses to the
crisis that there are various reasons for the above small
and short-lived impacts on the levels of non-
transaction accounts, saving deposits and interest-
bearing deposits, and their subsequent relatively stable
upward trends. Notwithstanding this, we now turn to
discuss how the evolution of the levels of these three
categories over the period covering the crisis and
beyond may have been influenced by four important
crisis-induced developments.
2.1 | Quantitative easing (QE)
The typical monetary policy tool of the Federal Reserve is
to use open market operations to influence its short-term
policy rate, such that the federal funds effective rate coin-
cides with the Fed's target for this rate, as chosen by the
FOMC.4 In doing so, the Fed is able to directly manipu-
late the supply of base money and indirectly control the
total money supply.
The Fed's typical expansionary policy tool of cutting
its target for the federal funds rate was not a feasible
FIGURE 2 Annual real total deposits in the U.S. banking
system
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response to the crisis-induced recession because the rate
was already effectively at its lower limit near zero. Addi-
tionally, given the depth of the Great Recession, leaving
the low federal funds rate unchanged would not on its
own have revived output and employment growth suffi-
ciently. The Fed's response therefore was to use uncon-
ventional monetary policy (Kuttner, 2018), a key part of
which was QE. QE involved three waves of substantial
purchases by the Fed of longer-term agency backed secu-
rities to place downward pressure on longer-term interest
rates to ease overall financial conditions. At the start of
the crisis the Fed's holding of domestic securities was less
than $1 trillion, but following the three waves the Fed's
balance sheet increased to over $4 trillion. QE was instru-
mental in stimulating the economic recovery and along
with the growth in the recovery period, there was the
associated increase in the monetary base. This increase in
base money supply will have in part manifested itself
through larger deposits, which is consistent with the rela-
tively stable upward trends in the post-crisis period in the
levels of non-transaction accounts, savings deposits and
interest-bearing deposits.
Savings deposits may have increased particularly fast
in the first part of the recovery (2010 and 2011) because
of the effect of the liquidity trap (i.e., a situation where
typical monetary policy using open market operations is
ineffective because interest rates are low and savings
rates are high). In a liquidity trap, funds are put into
savings rather than bonds because interest rates are
expected to rise soon, which discourages holding bonds
as it will push down their prices. In 2010 and 2011 mar-
ket investors anticipated that the federal funds rate
would soon rise (Rudebusch, 2018), but, as we will dis-
cuss further in Section 3, this turned out not to be
the case.
2.2 | Insufficient initial stimulation of
bank lending
A key feature of the crisis was the sudden end of the
credit boom. Among other things, markets for securitized
assets (except for mortgage securities with government
guarantees) shut down, which tended to leave concerning
levels of complex credit products and other illiquid assets
of uncertain value on the balance sheets of financial insti-
tutions. As a result, the U.S. banking system was in need
of a substantial injection of short-term liquidity. The Fed
took steps to provide this liquidity by creating reserve bal-
ances for sound financial institutions using a number of
new facilities for auctioning credit. These new facilities
included increasing the term of discount window loans
from overnight to 90 days and creating the Term
Securities Lending Facility, which auctions credit to
depository institutions for up to three months.
A key motivation of the Fed for this liquidity provi-
sion was to reduce banks' funding stresses. All else equal,
such provision should make banks more willing to lend,
thereby aiding the economic recovery. In the initial years
that followed the crisis, however, this increase in lending
did not materialize. A key reason for this was the intro-
duction of a rate of interest on bank reserves at the Fed,
which at the time was somewhat above the overnight fed-
eral funds lending rate. Also, in response to the crisis
banks became acutely risk averse. The upshot was that
banks did not use large portions of their Fed reserves to
finance lending, which were instead left idle.
Since the epicentre of the crisis was the turn of the
U.S. housing cycle and the associated rise in delinquen-
cies on sub-prime mortgages, which imposed substantial
losses on many financial institutions and shook investor
confidence, other things being equal, there will have
been more post-crisis risk aversion from both lenders and
borrowers towards mortgages vis-à-vis other loans. This
is evident from Figure 3 because we can see that real
estate lending in the U.S. flatlined since the 2008 crisis,
while there is clear evidence in 2012 of an upturn in
aggregate net loans and leases.5 As a consequence, it is
conceivable in the uncertain times during the crisis and
beyond that borrowers chose to keep the funds they
planned to add to their borrowings for spending and
investment purposes liquid in deposit accounts. Such
behaviour is consistent with the upward trends in non-
transaction accounts; savings deposits and interest-
bearing deposits that we observed above following the
crisis (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 3 Selected annual real loans in the U.S. banking
system
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Included in all three model specifications
Labour: Full-time equivalent total employees x1 203 2,556 331 5,249
Premises and fixed assets (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) x2 10,554 122,783 16,968 212,453
Loans: Net loans and leases (in '000s
2005 U.S. $)
y1 502,322 7,289,277 998,921 16,087,245
Total securities (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) y2 159,232 2,085,237 365,115 6,684,075
Total non-interest income (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) y3 17,196 313,789 29,712 661,950
Return on assets RoA = z1 1.10 0.77 0.69 1.10
Bank asset market share: Each bank's total
assets as a share of industry assets
MS = z2 0.0001 0.0018 0.0002 0.0034
Equity ratio: Total equity capital divided by
total assets
ER = z3 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.03
Indicator equal to 1 (0) if the bank is (not)
among the 100 largest banks measured by
total assets in the country in each year
Top = z4 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13
Security share: Securities (y2) as a share of
total assets
SEC = z5 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.15
Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI) of each
bank's asset portfolio across real estate loans,
farm loans, commercial and industrial loans,
loans to individuals and other loans as ratios
of total loans
Scope = z6 0.49 0.16 0.58 0.17
Loan loss allowance as a share of loans (y1) LLA = z7 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Number of years the institution has been
established
Age = z8 70 39 80 41
Number of domestic U.S. branches Branches = z9 9 72 16 156
Included in model specification 1 only
Transaction accounts of individuals,
partnerships and corporations (in '000s
2005 U.S. $)
x3 95,532 949,775 163,859 2,857,452
Non-transaction accounts of individuals,
partnerships and corporations (in '000s
2005 U.S. $)
x4 374,438 5,014,431 926,075 15,517,824
Other transaction and other non-transaction
accounts (in '000s 2005 U.S. $)
x5 34,520 414,379 89,763 1,283,289
Included in model specification 2 only
Total time deposits (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) x3 176,348 1,651,763 234,107 2,569,671
Total savings deposits (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) x4 249,791 3,856,166 794,160 14,578,740
Other deposits (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) x5 78,352 935,801 151,431 2,916,269
Included in model specification 3 only
Non-interest-bearing deposits (in '000s
2005 U.S. $)
x3 111,246 1,835,003 319,130 6,598,007
Interest-bearing deposits (in '000s 2005 U.S. $) x4 393,245 4,492,803 860,568 13,013,998
6 GLASS ET AL.
2.3 | Low federal funds rate forward
guidance
While early in the recovery market investors anticipated
that the federal funds rate would soon rise, the severity of
the recession and the conventional monetary policy
shortfall (i.e., the shortfall between what the Fed could
deliver with open market operations and what was
appropriate in such a deep recession) resulted in the Fed
having a different view. The Fed was instead of the opin-
ion that a low federal funds rate was needed for an
extended period, which was conditional on the expected
economic conditions going forward being realized. As
Rudebusch (2018) notes, on January 25, 2012, the FOMC
conveyed this to investors when it stated that “economic
conditions…are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
TABLE 2 Model specification 1 estimation results for the 1992–2007 and 2008–2015 IDFs









* * * y3x5 0.001 y2 −0.303
* * * y3x5 −0.001
y3 −0.073
* * * T 0.005* * * y3 −0.059
* * * t −0.007* * *
x2 0.006
* * * t2 0.000* * * x2 0.016
* * * t2 0.003* * *
x3 0.183
* * * y1t 0.001
* * * x3 0.164
* * * y1t 0.001
*
x4 0.498
* * * y2t 0.003
* * * x4 0.453
* * * y2t 0.000
x5 0.065
* * *
−0.001* * * x5 0.070
* * * y3t 0.000
y21 −0.067
* * * x2t 0.000 y21 −0.054
* * * x2t 0.000
y22 −0.038
* * * x3t 0.001
* * * y22 −0.025
* * * x3t 0.003
* * *
y23 −0.014
* * * x4t −0.003
* * * y23 −0.009
* * * x4t −0.002
* * *
y1y2 0.096
* * * x5t 0.000
* y1y2 0.062
* * * x5t 0.000
y1y3 0.032
* * * RoA 0.010* * * y1y3 0.022
* * * RoA 0.005* * *
y2y3 −0.007
* * * MS −2.184* * * y2y3 −0.006
* * * MS 2.440* * *
x22 0.000 ER 0.452
* * * x22 0.002
* * * ER 0.684* * *
x23 0.027
* * * Top 0.016* * * x23 0.027
* * * Top 0.003
x24 0.048
* * * SEC 0.799* * * x24 0.044
* * * SEC 0.523* * *
x25 0.015
* * * Scope 0.034* * * x25 0.015
* * * Scope −0.013*
x2x3 −0.010
* * * LLA −1.617* * * x2x3 −0.003
* LLA −1.095* * *
x2x4 0.007
* * * Age 0.000 x2x4 0.006
* * * Age 0.008* * *
x2x5 −0.001
** Branches −0.174* * * x2x5 −0.002 Branches −0.252
* * *
x3x4 −0.055
* * * Intercept −0.249* * * x3x4 −0.063
* * * Intercept −0.170* * *
x3x5 −0.007
* * * Random Effects Parameters x3x5 −0.008
* * * Random Effects Parameters
x4x5 −0.015
* * * sd(x3) 0.110
* * * x4x5 −0.026
* * * sd(x3) 0.097
* * *
y1x2 −0.009
* * * sd(x4) 0.143
* * * y1x2 −0.004
* * * sd(x4) 0.143
* * *
y1x3 −0.007
* * * sd(x5) 0.046
* * * y1x3 −0.006
* * * sd(x5) 0.050
* * *
y1x4 0.018
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.120* * * y1x4 0.009
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.151* * *
y1x5 0.003
* * * corr(x3, x4) −0.019 y1x5 0.004
* * * corr(x3, x4) 0.014
y2x2 0.010
* * * corr(x3, x5) 0.030 y2x2 0.003
* * * corr(x3, x5) −0.029
y2x3 −0.004
* * * corr(x3, Intercept) 0.045
** y2x3 0.003
** corr(x3, Intercept) 0.015
y2x4 −0.017
* * * corr(x4, x5) −0.089
* * * y2x4 −0.011
* * * corr(x4, x5) −0.065
*
y2x5 −0.009
* * * corr(x4, Intercept) 0.024 y2x5 −0.005
* * * corr(x4, Intercept) 0.055
*
y3x2 0.002
* * * corr(x5, Intercept) 0.078
* * * y3x2 0.004
* * * corr(x5, Intercept) 0.114
* * *
y3x3 0.003
* * * y3x3 −0.001
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. sd and corr denote standard deviation and corre-
lation, respectively.
GLASS ET AL. 7
for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”
Given the depth of the recession and the conventional
monetary policy shortfall, in this forward guidance
communication the FOMC provided more certainty
about the federal funds rate going forward than it
would ordinarily do in such statements. The FOMC
provided this greater certainty to drive down longer-
term interest rates by pushing down expectations of
the federal funds rate going forward, and thereby pro-
moting growth.
Growth is accompanied by an increase in the mone-
tary base, which will have in part manifested itself
through the larger deposits we observed in the post-crisis
period (i.e., the relatively stable upward trends over this
period in non-transaction accounts, savings deposits and
interest-bearing deposits). By conveying that future short
TABLE 3 Model specification 2 estimation results for the 1992–2007 and 2008–2015 IDFs
Before the crisis (1992 − 2007) Crisis and beyond (2008 − 2015)
y1 −0.435
* * *





* * * y3x5 −0.004
* * * y2 −0.286
* * * y3x5 0.001
y3 −0.072
* * * t 0.005* * * y3 −0.057
* * * t −0.005* * *
x2 0.005
* * * t2 0.000* * * x2 0.017
* * * t2 0.003* * *
x3 0.369
* * * y1t 0.000 x3 0.300
* * * y1t −0.001
* * *
x4 0.275
* * * y2t 0.003
* * * x4 0.284
* * * y2t −0.001
* * *
x5 0.109
* * * y3t −0.001
* * * x5 0.106
* * * y3t 0.000
y21 −0.068
* * * x2t 0.000
* * * y21 −0.051
* * * x2t 0.000
y22 −0.038
* * * x3t −0.001
* * * y22 −0.023
* * * x3t −0.003
* * *
y23 −0.013
* * * x4t −0.001
* * * y23 −0.009
* * * x4t 0.004
* * *
y1y2 0.099
* * * x5t 0.000 y1y2 0.053
* * * x5t 0.003
* * *
y1y3 0.030
* * * RoA 0.014* * * y1y3 0.023
* * * RoA 0.005* * *
y2y3 −0.008
* * * MS −5.911* * * y2y3 −0.005
* * * MS 1.849**
x22 0.001
* ER 0.449* * * x22 0.002
* * * ER 0.724* * *
x23 0.069
* * * Top 0.014** x23 0.062
* * * Top −0.003
x24 0.043
* * * SEC 0.809* * * x24 0.041
* * * SEC 0.423* * *
x25 0.019
* * * Scope 0.037* * * x25 0.019
* * * Scope −0.020* * *
.x2x3 0.000 LLA −1.688
* * * x2x3 −0.005
** LLA −1.249* * * .
x2x4 −0.001 Age 0.002
** x2x4 0.002 Age 0.009
* * *
x2x5 0.003
* * * Branches −0.166* * * x2x5 −0.002 Branches −0.246
* * *
x3x4 −0.068
* * * Intercept −0.254* * * x3x4 −0.078
* * * Intercept −0.148* * *
x3x5 −0.042
* * * Random Effects Parameters x3x5 −0.028
* * * Random Effects Parameters
x4x5 −0.022
* * * sd(x3) 0.114
* * * x4x5 −0.042
* * * sd(x3) 0.111
* * *
y1x2 −0.008
* * * sd(x4) 0.117
* * * y1x2 −0.004
* * * sd(x4) 0.105
* * *
y1x3 0.001 sd(x5) 0.091
* * * y1x3 0.000 sd(x5) 0.074
* * *
y1x4 0.019
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.116* * * y1x4 0.019
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.144* * *
y1x5 0.002 corr(x3, x4) −0.060
* * * y1x5 0.002 corr(x3, x4) 0.026
y2x2 0.011
* * * corr(x3, x5) −0.095
* * * y2x2 0.003
* * * corr(x3, x5) 0.114
* * *
y2x3 −0.020
* * * corr(x3, Intercept) 0.006 y2x3 −0.011 corr(x3, Intercept) 0.027
y2x4 −0.018
* * * corr(x4, x5) −0.058
** y2x4 0.000 corr(x4, x5) 0.144
* * *
y2x5 0.004
* * * corr(x4, Intercept) 0.003 y2x5 0.000 corr(x4, Intercept) 0.080
* * *
y3x2 0.000 corr(x5, Intercept) 0.138




Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. sd and corr denote standard deviation and corre-
lation, respectively.
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rates were likely to be low, the FOMC placed downward
pressure on the expectations components of the yields
from longer-term bonds by reducing the averages of the
expected short-term interest rates over the maturities of
the bonds.
2.4 | Increase in the level of deposits
covered by federal insurance
From 1980 until the crisis, the per-depositor limit insured
at each member bank by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) was $100,000. The 1933 Banking Act
created the FDIC to restore trust in the U.S. banking
system. This was because in the portion of the Great
Depression before the FDIC was formed more than one
third of banks failed and bank runs were common. To
restore the loss in depositor confidence due to the 2008
crisis and thereby help stabilize the U.S. banking system,
from October 3, 2008 to December 31, 2010, Congress
temporarily increased the per-depositor limit that was
covered by the FDIC insurance fund to $250,000.
There had been a run on deposits at Washington
Mutual and, as a result, Wachovia, and increasing the
per-depositor insurance limit was designed to guard
against similar runs at other banks. Washington Mutual
failed on September 26, 2008 following a ten-day run on
its deposits and represented a large bank failure during
TABLE 4 Model specification 3 estimation results for the 1992–2007 and 2008–2015 IDFs
Before the crisis (1992 − 2007) Crisis and beyond (2008 − 2015)
y1 −0.436
* * * y3x4 0.003
* y1 −0.486
* * * y3x4 −0.006
* * *
y2 −0.418
* * * t 0.005* * * y2 −0.293
* * * t −0.007* * *
y3 −0.074
* * * t2 0.000* * * y3 −0.061
* * * t2 0.003* * *
x2 0.005
* * * y1t 0.001
* * * x2 0.015
* * * y1t 0.000
x3 0.114
* * * y2t 0.003
* * * x3 0.115
* * * y2t 0.000
x4 0.639
* * * y3t −0.001
* * * x4 0.576
* * * y3t 0.000
y21 −0.068
* * * x2t 0.000
** y21 −0.055
* * * x2t 0.000
y22 −0.038
* * * x3t 0.001
* * * y22 −0.024
* * * x3t 0.003
* * *
y23 −0.014
* * * x4t −0.004
* * * y23 −0.009
* * * x4t −0.001
y1y2 0.101
* * * RoA 0.014* * * y1y2 0.060
* * * RoA 0.005* * *
y1y3 0.032
* * * MS −5.011* * * y1y3 0.025
* * * MS 2.944* * *
y2y3 −0.010
* * * ER 0.461* * * y2y3 −0.007
* * * ER 0.694* * *
x22 0.000 Top 0.020
* * * x22 0.002
* * * Top 0.009
x23 0.015
* * * SEC 0.775* * * x23 0.023
* * * SEC 0.428* * *
x24 0.065
* * * Scope 0.038* * * x24 0.036
* * * Scope −0.018**
x2x3 −0.001 LLA −1.669
* * * x2x3 −0.003 LLA −1.190
* * *
x2x4 0.003
* Age 0.002 x2x4 0.000 Age 0.012
* * *
x3x4 −0.071
* * * Branches −0.171* * * x3x4 −0.082
* * * Branches −0.241* * *
y1x2 −0.009
* * * Intercept −0.224* * * y1x2 −0.004
* * * Intercept −0.115* * *
y1x3 0.002 Random Effects Parameters y1x3 0.006
* * * Random Effects Parameters
y1x4 0.013
* * * sd(x3) 0.108
* * * y1x4 0.024
* * * sd(x3) 0.097
* * *
y2x2 0.010
* * * sd(x4) 0.172
* * * y2x2 0.003
* * * sd(x4) 0.174
* * *
y2x3 0.002
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.125* * * y2x3 0.003
* * * sd(Intercept) 0.145* * *
y2x4 −0.040
* * * corr(x3, x4) −0.175
* * * y2x4 −0.028
* * * corr(x3, x4) −0.093
* * *
y3x2 0.002
* corr(x3, Intercept) 0.084
* * * y3x2 0.003
* * * corr(x3, Intercept) 0.077
* * *




Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. sd and corr denote standard deviation and correla-
tion, respectively.
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the crisis with assets of $307 billion. This led to a run on
deposits at Wachovia, another large troubled bank, as
depositors drew their accounts below the $100,000 insur-
ance limit.
On May 20, 2009, the temporary increase in the per-
depositor insurance limit to $250,000 was extended to
December 31, 2013, and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act made this higher
TABLE 5 Elasticities of substitution and complementarity between deposit types from model specification 1 of the input distance
function
Model 1 (1992 − 2007) Model 1 (2008–2015)
AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES
D2-D1 0.40* * * 0.71* * * 0.60* * * 1.94 1.71 1.76 D2-D1 0.16* * * 0.65* * * 0.52* * * 2.31 1.70 1.92
D3-D1 0.39* * * 0.73* * * 0.73* * * 0.96 1.27 1.19 D3-D1 0.32** 0.74* * * 0.74* * * 1.23 1.38 1.35
D1-D2 0.40* * * 0.71* * * 0.74* * * 1.94 1.71 1.69 D1-D2 0.16* * * 0.65* * * 0.70* * * 2.31 1.70 1.63
D3-D2 0.55* * * 0.73* * * 0.74* * * 1.23 1.23 1.21 D3-D2 0.18** 0.74* * * 0.73* * * 2.01 1.46 1.41
D1-D3 0.39* * * 0.73* * * 0.74* * * 0.96 1.27 1.51 D1-D3 0.32** 0.74* * * 0.73* * * 1.23 1.38 1.45
D2-D3 0.55* * * 0.73* * * 0.68* * * 1.23 1.23 1.41 D2-D3 0.18** 0.74* * * 0.53* * * 2.01 1.46 1.78
Note: For asymmetric elasticities of substitution and complementarity the price or quantity of the first input in a pair changes.
D1 denotes transaction accounts of individuals, partnerships and corporations; D2 denotes non-transaction accounts of individuals, partnerships and
corporations; D3 denotes other transaction and other non-transaction accounts.
SEs for the elasticities of complementarity are calculated using the delta method.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 6 Elasticities of substitution and complementarity between deposit types from model specification 2 of the input distance
function
Model 2 (1992 − 2007) Model 2 (2008 − 2015)
AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES
D2–D1 0.33* * * 0.62* * * 0.66* * * 1.59 1.63 1.47 D2-D1 0.08* 0.56* * * 0.60* * * 2.27 1.89 1.83
D3–D1 −0.05 0.65* * * 0.71* * * 2.91 1.77 1.60 D3-D1 0.12 0.68* * * 0.73* * * 1.93 1.55 1.44
D1–D2 0.33* * * 0.62* * * 0.57* * * 1.59 1.63 1.85 D1-D2 0.08* 0.56* * * 0.52* * * 2.27 1.89 1.95
D3–D2 0.28* * * 0.72* * * 0.75* * * 1.73 1.49 1.48 D3-D2 −0.41* * * 0.68* * * 0.67* * * 2.80 1.65 1.53
D1–D3 −0.05 0.65* * * 0.43* * * 2.91 1.77 2.34 D1-D3 0.12 0.68* * * 0.53* * * 1.93 1.55 1.85
D2–D3 0.28* * * 0.72* * * 0.64* * * 1.73 1.49 1.51 D2-D3 −0.41* * * 0.68* * * 0.46* * * 2.80 1.65 1.98
Note: For asymmetric elasticities of substitution and complementarity the price or quantity of the first input in a pair changes.
D1 denotes total time deposits; D2 denotes total savings deposits; D3 denotes other deposits.
SEs for the elasticities of complementarity are calculated using the delta method.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.








AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES AEC SEC MEC AES SES MES
D2-D1 0.02 0.68* * * 0.27* * * 2.87 1.89 2.64 D2-D1 −0.24* * * 0.59* * * 0.23* * * 3.23 1.96 2.65
D1-D2 0.02 0.68* * * 0.76* * * 2.87 1.89 1.75 D1-D2 −0.24* * * 0.59* * * 0.66* * * 3.23 1.96 1.82
Note: For asymmetric elasticities of substitution and complementarity the price or quantity of the first input in a pair changes.
D1 denotes non-interest-bearing deposits; D2 denotes interest-bearing deposits.
SEs for the elasticities of complementarity are calculated using the delta method.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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limit permanent. The permanent increase in the insur-
ance limit will have led to an increase in deposits, which
is in line with the reasonably stable post-crisis upward
trends in the levels of non-transaction accounts, savings
deposits and interest-bearing deposits that we observed
in Figure 1. The permanent increase in the insurance
limit is a part of Dodd-Frank that related to deposits to
guard against a repeat of the banking instability in the
crisis. There are various other parts of Dodd-Frank that
focus on other aspects of banks' activities to prevent such
instability in the future. For example, the Volcker Rule
was designed to prevent a repeat of the excessive risk tak-
ing by banks by preventing banks from using their own
accounts for various speculative trading activities that do
not benefit their customers.
In contrast to the 2008 crisis leading to some fluctua-
tions in, in particular, the levels of non-transaction
accounts and interest-bearing deposits, it is evident from
Figure 1 that there are some deposit types where there
has been no such variability over our study period.
FIGURE 4 Radar diagrams of the elasticities of substitution and complementarity between the deposit types from model specification 1
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Changes in the levels of some deposit types have instead
evolved steadily over time. Such changes and our reason-
ing for these changes in depositors' preferences are as fol-
lows. First, we can see from Panel A in Figure 1 that the
2008 crisis marked the end of the gradual upward trend
in the level of other transaction and other non-
transaction accounts, after which there was a flatlining of
this deposit type. It is conceivable that this flatlining is
because the crisis prompted depositors to be more conser-
vative about non-traditional deposit types. This would
lead to depositors having a greater preference for core
transaction and core non-transaction accounts, which is
consistent with the levels of both these accounts, and par-
ticularly the latter, trending upwards in the post-crisis
period (see panel A of Figure 1).
Second, in the period covering the crisis and beyond,
panel B of Figure 1 reveals a non-negligible downward
trend in time deposits, which together with the marked
upward trend in savings deposits suggests that the crisis
prompted a much greater preference for more liquid
FIGURE 5 Radar diagrams of the elasticities of substitution and complementarity between the deposit types from model specification 2
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE 8 Z-scores for tests of the 2008–2015 elasticities of complementarity against the corresponding 1992–2007 elasticity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AEC SEC MEC AEC SEC MEC AEC SEC MEC
D2-D1 5.48* * * 1.66* 2.54** D2-D1 6.29* * * 2.45** 2.00* D2-D1 4.18* * * 1.59 0.93
D3-D1 0.56 −0.05 −0.16 D3-D1 −2.10* −0.49 −0.21
D1-D2 5.48* * * 1.66* 1.20 D1-D2 6.29* * * 2.45** 1.81* D1-D2 4.18* * * 1.59 1.47
D3-D2 5.66* * * 0.56 0.18 D3-D2 6.83* * * 1.85* 1.19
D1-D3 0.56 −0.05 0.27 D1-D3 −2.10* −0.49 −2.10*
D2-D3 5.66* * * 0.56 3.22* * * D2-D3 6.83* * * 1.85* 3.21* * *
Note: Model 1: D1 denotes transaction accounts of individuals, partnerships and corporations; D2 denotes non- transaction accounts of individuals, partnerships and corporations; D3 denotes
other transaction and other non-transaction accounts.
Model 2: D1 denotes total time deposits; D2 denotes total savings deposits; D3 denotes other deposits.
Model 3: D1 denotes non-interest-bearing deposits; D2 denotes interest-bearing deposits.











deposits. Third and finally, it is evident from panel B of
Figure 1 that there is a diminishing upward trend in sav-
ings deposits over the period 2002–2007. This is to be
expected as it is in line with the progression of the
U.S. economy through the expansion phase of the busi-
ness cycle (2001:Q4-2007:Q3, inclusive), and towards the
crisis-induced recession phase (2007:Q4-2009:Q2,
inclusive).6
3 | MODELLING FRAMEWORK:
INPUT DISTANCE AND COST
FUNCTIONS, DUALITY AND
ESTIMATION
Let x ∈ R+be the set of K inputs, indexed k = 1, …, K, that
producers have at their disposal. Now let y ∈ R+ be the
set of M outputs, indexed m = 1, …, M, that producers
use x to produce. As we adopt an input-oriented
approach, the production technology is characterized by
the input requirement set I(y) = {x ∈ R+ :
x can produce y}. I(y) therefore describes the sets of
input vectors that are feasible for each output vector. À la
McFadden (1978), we represent the general form of this









where the scalar λ ≥1 and DI denotes distance to the IDF.
All points on the convex IDF correspond to λ = 1 and hence
DI = 1 and represent minimum radial combinations of
input quantities that can be used to produce given output
vectors. An IDF has the following five properties
(McFadden, 1978): (a) non-decreasing in x, ∂lnDI(y, x)/
∂lnxk ≡ exk ≥ 0, where exk is the kth input elasticity;
(b) non-increasing in y, ∂lnDI(y, x)/∂lnym ≡ eym ≤ 0, where
eym is the mth output elasticity; (c) homogeneity of degree
one in x, DI(y, x/xk) = DI(y, x)/xk; (d) concave and continu-








is the scale elasticity of the IDF representation of the
production technology.




px :DI y,xð Þ≥1f g, ð2Þ
where p ∈ R+ is the set of K input prices and
C=
PK
k=1pkxk is the expenditure on inputs. Accordingly,
there is a direct correspondence between the above five
properties of DI(y, x) and the following five properties of
C(y, p): (a) non-decreasing in y, ∂lnC(y, p)/
∂lnym≡ eym≥ 0; (b) non-decreasing in p, ∂lnC(y, p)/
∂lnpk≡ epk≥ 0, where epk is the kth input price
elasticity; (c) homogeneity of degree one in p, C(y, p/










the scale elasticity of the cost function representation of
the production technology.
Given the duality between the IDF and the cost func-
tion, they are completely symmetric in their treatment of
input quantities and input prices conditional on the fixed
output vector (Shephard, 1970). The IDF can therefore be
recovered from the cost function as follows:
DI y,xð Þmin
p
px :C y,pð Þ≥1f g: ð3Þ
Applying Shephard's lemma (Shephard, 1970) to the

















Consider the general form of the IDF in Equation (6),
a version of which we estimate in the empirical analysis.
The dependent variable is −xK, where lower case letters
denote logged variables. We obtain this dependent vari-
able by applying property (iii) of an IDF from above and
normalizing the other inputs on the right-hand side by
the input on the left.
−xKit = αi +TLi ~xit,yit, tð Þ+ γ
0
izit + εit, ð6Þ
where






















In each cross-section, there are N units, indexed i = 1,
…, N, that operate over T periods, indexed t = 1, …, T,
where we consider the typical case that is encountered
when using firm level data of large N and small T. αi is
an intercept, which, as is the case for the other
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parameters in Equation (6), is for the ith unit. This is
because Equation (6) represents a random coefficients
specification, which, as we discuss in more detail further
in this section, is well suited to our very heterogeneous
sample of U.S. banks as it yields a richer set of parameter
estimates than the fixed parameters from standard fixed
and random effects models. TLi ~xit,yit , tð Þ in Equation (6)
represents the variable returns to scale translog approxi-
mation of the log of the IDF production technology.
~xit = xit−xKit denotes the (1× (K− 1)) vector of observa-
tions for the normalized logged inputs and yit is the
(1×M) vector of observations for the logged outputs. t is
a time trend and by interacting the outputs and normal-
ized inputs with t technical change is non-neutral. zit is a
vector of observations for the variables that shift the IDF
production technology and εit is the idiosyncratic distur-











i are vectors of regression parameters, and Θi, Γi and
Φi are matrices of the regression parameters θi, τi and ϕi,
respectively. It follows from the properties of the translog
functional form (Christensen, Jorgenson, & Lau, 1973)
that Equation (6) is twice differentiable with respect to a
logged output and a normalized logged input. The associ-
ated Hessians are symmetric because of the symmetry
restrictions that are imposed on Θi and Γi (e.g., τi,
1M = τi, M1).
In our random coefficients model the heterogeneity
between the banks is treated as stochastic variation. Our
model has a rich specification that permits two levels of
latent variables pertaining to a fixed component across all
banks and a heterogeneous random component for each
bank. With such a specification, each bank has its own IDF
with its own set of parameters to better reflect the extent of
the heterogeneity across U.S. banks. It is possible to esti-
mate a full random coefficients model, as specified in Equa-
tion (6), where each parameter is estimated for each bank,
or a partial random coefficients model, where the set of
parameters for each bank is a mix of fixed parameters
across all banks and parameters that are estimated for each
bank. When using very large data sets to estimate models
with a quite a large number of variables, as is the case in
this paper, it is more practical to estimate a partial random
coefficients model, otherwise estimation time becomes
infeasible. As we are interested in deposit type substitution/
complementarity, we therefore estimate an IDF for each
bank with a set of random slopes for the first-order deposit
types, ξi, to reflect the heterogeneity in the banks' technolo-
gies. ξi  κi as κi also contains fixed parameter estimates for
non-deposit inputs. ξi is distributed according to the follow-
ing (K − L) variate normal distribution, where K is the total
number of inputs and L is the number of non-deposit
inputs:
ξi N ξ,Ωð Þ, i=1,…,N : ð7Þ
In Equation (7) ξ is the ((K−L)× 1) vector of parame-
ter means and Ω is the ((K−L)× (K−L)) positive definite
covariance matrix. The model assumes that ξijξ,Ωð Þ and
εit are i.i.d. In the empirical analysis, we provide further
justification for limiting the random coefficients model-
ling to the first-order deposit types. Note that we only
touch on the approach to the random coefficients model-
ling here as it is a standard approach. For a more detailed
discussion of random coefficients modelling see, among
others, Cuthbertson, Hall, and Taylor (1992).
4 | INPUT ELASTICITIES OF
SUBSTITUTION AND
COMPLEMENTARITY FROM AN IDF
Turning now to a presentation of the six elasticities of sub-
stitution and complementarity that we compute from a
fitted IDF. For a synthesis of the literature on elasticities of
substitution and complementarity with reference to compu-
tation of the elasticities from a cost function, see
Stern (2011). Our presentation of the elasticities, which also
provides an insight into the evolution of the literature, is in
terms of two inputs x* and x∘ from the input vector x.
4.1 | Symmetric AEC
Blackorby and Russell (1981) derive this elasticity and
refer to it as the true dual of the AES under non-constant
returns to scale. Kim (2000), on the other hand, refers to
this elasticity as the AEC, which is the terminology we
use here.7 To measure the response to a change in the















where applying Shephard's lemma to the IDF yields the
inverse input demand function for input ∘, P∘(y, x) = ∂DI(y, x)/
∂x∘, which measures the shadow price of the input. From the
IDF we also obtain the cost share equation for input *, S*=
∂lnDI(y, x)/∂lnx*.
In our empirical analysis we use the fitted IDF to
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where θi, * ∘ is the relevant element of Θi from TLi(xit, yit,
t) in Equation (6). At the sample mean Si, * = κi, * and
Si, ∘ = κi, ∘, where κi, * and κi, ∘ are the relevant elements
of κ
0
i from TLi(xit, yit, t). This is because we use mean
adjusted data and, as a result, the terms in the partial
derivatives of Equation (6) that relate to the quadratic
and interaction terms in TLi(xit, yit, t) are zero at the
sample mean.
4.2 | Symmetric AES
The AES is jointly due to Allen (1934, 1938), who shows
how to compute the AES from a production function
(i.e., the primal AES), and Uzawa (1962), who shows
how to calculate the AES from a cost function (i.e., the
dual AES). Given the duality between the cost function
and the IDF we compute the dual AES in our empirical
analysis. The formula for the dual AES to measure the
response to a change in input price p* is given in Equa-
tion (10). This formula is valid not just for a single out-
put, which is how Allen (1938) presented the primal



















To obtain the AES*∘ in our empirical analysis we draw
on Broer (2004) by obtaining the matrix of AESs, AES*∘,
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where ι is a column vector of ones and the elements of
AEC*∘ and Sk are computed as described above [see
Equation (9)].
4.3 | Asymmetric MEC
The formula for the MEC*∘ from Blackorby and Rus-
sell (1981) and Kim (2000) to measure the response to a
change in input quantity x* is:
MEC*∘ =
∂ln ∂DI y,xð Þ
∂x*












From Equation (13) we can see that the MEC is the differ-
ence between two input quantity elasticities, which are in terms
of two inverse input demand functions. The MEC*∘ measures
the optimal change in the shadow input price ratio when x*
changes in the fixed input quantity ratio and x∘ is allowed to
adjust optimally by holding the price of input ∘ constant. In our
empirical analysis, we calculate theMEC*∘ using Equation (13).
This involves obtaining equations from Equation (8) for
AEC*∘S* and AEC**S* and substituting in for the two terms on
the right-hand side of Equation (13), respectively.
4.4 | Asymmetric MES
The MES dates back to Morishima (1967) and the for-
mula for the MES in Blackorby and Russell (1975) for the
optimal response to a change in input price p* is:
MES*∘ =
∂ln ∂C y,pð Þ
∂p
*









Following Blackorby and Russell (1989) Equation (14)

































where X∘(y, p) and X*(y, p) are factor input demand func-
tions from Equation (4). To compute the MES*∘ in our
empirical analysis we use the corresponding approach to
calculate the MEC*∘. This involves using Equation (10) to
obtain equations for AES*∘S* and AES**S*, and these
equations are then substituted into Equation (15).
4.5 | Symmetric SEC
The corresponding primal elasticity of complementary
to the dual SES, which is the final elasticity we present, is
the SEC (Stern, 2010). The SEC measures the optimal
response of the shadow input price ratio to a change in
the ratio of two input quantities, holding any other input
quantities, the quantity of output and distance constant.
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As the SEC refers to movements along the input distance
frontier it has the appealing feature that it measures
input substitution when production is technically effi-
cient. In contrast, the input quantity ratio is fixed for the
AEC and the MEC so it is not possible for one input
quantity to change holding output constant unless dis-
tance changes. The AEC and MEC do not therefore mea-
sure input substitution along the input distance frontier.
The formula for the SEC is:
SEC*∘ =
∂ln ∂DI y,xð Þ
∂x*


























∂DI y,xð Þ=∂x*ð Þx*
+ 1
∂DI y,xð Þ=∂x∘ð Þx∘
: ð16Þ
As in Equation (17), the SEC can be shown to be the
share-weighted average of three AECs (Stern, 2010),
which is the result we use to calculate the SEC in our
empirical analysis. To obtain Equation (17): (a) In Equa-
tion (8) for the AEC**, AEC*∘ and AEC∘∘ we set DI(y, x) = 1
because input substitution occurs along the input
distance frontier. We then substitute into the numerator
of Equation (16) to obtain −AEC** + 2AEC*∘ − AEC∘∘.
(b) In the inverse demand functions for inputs * and ∘
from the IDF (e.g., P∘ = ∂DI(y, x)/∂x∘ = (∂lnDI(y, x)/∂lnx∘)
DI(y, x)/x∘) we set DI(y, x) = 1 and drawing on the cost
share equations from the IDF (e.g., S∘ = ∂lnD(y, x)/∂lnx∘)
we rewrite and substitute in for each term in the denomi-
nator of Equation (16) (e.g., 1
S∘
= 1












−AEC** +2AEC*∘−AEC∘∘ð Þ: ð17Þ
4.6 | Symmetric SES
McFadden (1963) derived the SES which Mundlak (1968)
observes is the MES when cost is held constant. Whereas
the MES is asymmetric the SES is symmetric because of
the constant cost requirement. Since the SEC measures
input substitution along the input distance frontier and
the SES measures input substitution along the isocost
curve, it is clear that the SEC is the dual of the SES. The
formula for the SES is as follows.
SES*∘ =
∂ln ∂C y,pð Þ
∂p
*









































∂C y,pð Þ=∂p∘ð Þp∘
: ð18Þ
Analogous to the above representation of the SEC,
the SES can be expressed as the following share-weighted
average of three AESs, which is the result we use to com-
pute the SES in our empirical analysis. In brief given the
analogous nature of the SES, we obtain Equation (19) by
first setting C(y, p) = 1 in Equation (10) for the AES**,
AES*∘ and AES∘∘, and we then substitute into the numer-
ator of Equation (18). We next set C(y, p) = 1 in the
demand functions for inputs * and ∘ and using the cost
share equations we rearrange and substitute in for each




−AES** +2AES*∘−AES∘∘ð Þ: ð19Þ
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Data, variables and model
specifications
We estimate a number of specifications of the IDF for
insured U.S. commercial banks for two time periods
using rich annual year-end unbalanced panel data. The
first time period is 1992–2007 and the second is
2008–2015. Following Vazquez and Federico (2015), who
refer to 2001–2007 as capturing the evolution of bank
financial conditions in the run up to the crisis and
2008–2009 as the crisis period, we interpret our first sam-
ple as a pre-crisis period and we refer to our second as a
period that covers the crisis and beyond. Looking ahead
to our fitted models, testing whole sets of parameters
from the models for the two periods against one another
using a Wald test justifies splitting the entire sample. See
the presentation and analysis of our fitted IDFs in subsec-
tion 5.2 for a discussion of these test results.
We omit each bank-year from the two data sets where
there was a missing observation for a variable. The
resulting data sets we use for the periods 1992–2007 and
2008–2015 are both large, as they comprise 127,076 bank-
year observations and 44,504 bank-year observations,
respectively. All the data for the variables was either
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extracted directly from the Reports of Condition and
Income (i.e., the Call Reports) of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, which we obtain from the FDIC, or was constructed
by the authors using data from this source. All monetary
volumes are deflated to 2005 prices using the consumer
price index.
To make appropriate comparisons we use the same
set of variables to estimate the IDF for each time period.
The inputs and outputs in our IDF specifications are
based on the Sealey and Lindley (1977) intermediation
approach to banking. We therefore assume, first, that
banks use the savings of consumers and firms to make
investments and, second, that banks seek to minimize
the cost associated with the production of their outputs.
In Table 1 we describe the variables we use to estimate
the models and provide summary statistics for these vari-
ables for both sample periods. For each sample period we
estimate three model specifications using three outputs
(y1 − y3), which reflect the lending and non-lending
activities of the banks. These three model specifications
also have nine z variables that shift the IDF production
technology (z1 − z9). Model specifications 1 and 2 have
five inputs and model specification 3 has four inputs. All
three model specifications include as inputs, the number
of full-time equivalent employees as the labour input, x1,
and premises and fixed assets, x2. The remaining inputs
in the three model specifications represent different dis-
aggregations of total deposits. For example, model specifi-
cation 1 disaggregates total deposits into transaction
accounts, non-transaction accounts and other transaction
and other non-transaction accounts.
From inspecting, the mean levels of the deposit types
in Table 1 we can see that there were large increases
between the periods 1992–2007 and 2008–2015. To illus-
trate, across the eight deposit types we consider, the
smallest percentage increase is the 33% rise in mean total
time deposits, while the largest percentage increase is the
huge 218% rise in mean total savings deposits.
Turning next to a discussion of the fitted IDFs, where
all the inputs and outputs are logged. We then mean
adjust the inputs and outputs and the time trend so the
associated first-order parameters can be interpreted as
elasticities at the sample mean.
5.2 | Discussion of the estimated input
distance functions
The estimated IDFs for model specifications 1–3 for the
period before the crisis (1992–2007) and for the period
covering the crisis and beyond (2008–2015) are presented
in Tables 2–4. −x1 is the dependent variable for the
reported IDFs and is also therefore the normalizing input
for these models. To recap, we account for the heteroge-
neity across the banks via a set of random intercepts and
via a set of random slopes for a first-order deposit type as
we are primarily interested in deposit type substitution/
complementarity. All the other parameters are the usual
fixed estimates. Furthermore, from a practical perspective
we only estimate random slopes for the first-order deposit
types rather than for all the variables in the models so
that model run time does not become excessive.8 For
each first-order deposit type we obtain a slope parameter
for each bank so to facilitate interpretation we report an
average of these parameters across the banks. We com-
pute the associated t-statistic by dividing this average
parameter by the SD of the parameters for the individual
banks.
For each bank the intercept and slope for each
deposit type are made up of a fixed component and a het-
erogeneous random component. In Tables 2–4, the rele-
vant SD indicates whether there is significant variation
across the banks between the random components of the
coefficients on a first-order deposit type. This variation
across the banks in the random components of the coeffi-
cients on a first-order deposit type would be overlooked
by a fixed parameter model, whereas the widespread sig-
nificant SDs for first-order deposit types in Tables 2–4
provide support for random parameter modelling of these
variables. Moreover, fixed parameter models implicitly
allow correlation between the intercept and the regres-
sors, but the model output from a random parameters
model is more explicit about this correlation. To illus-
trate, the correlations in Tables 2–4 indicate that there
are a number of cases where there is significant correla-
tion between the random components of the intercept
and a first-order deposit type.
To ascertain whether the fitted models support split-
ting the entire sample, a Wald test is used to test the null
hypothesis of equality of the two sets of parameters for
the pre-crisis period and the period covering the crisis
and beyond. For all three model specifications, we reject
the null that the two sets of parameters are equal at the
0.1% level, which supports estimating separate IDFs for
1992–2007 and 2008–2015.9
As expected, the three fitted model specifications for
both sample periods in Tables 2–4 all yield negative out-
put elasticities and positive input elasticities at the sam-
ple mean. We can therefore conclude that at the sample
mean all the fitted models satisfy the monotonicity prop-
erty of the translog IDF. From the estimates of model
specifications 1–3 for 1992–2007, we observe evidence of
moderate increasing returns to scale that lie within the
narrow band of 1.07–1.09. Even though we find evidence
of only moderate increasing returns Wald tests reveal
that in each case the returns are significantly different
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from 1 at the 0.1% level. This is because the variances
and covariances of the first-order output parameters are
particularly small. This evidence of moderate increasing
returns is consistent with a good proportion of the find-
ings for pre-crisis samples from two seminal studies of
returns to scale in U.S. banking (Wheelock &
Wilson, 2001, 2012).
Interestingly, our three fitted model specifications for
2008–2015 all suggest that there are larger increasing
returns to scale in our second sample period. Our returns
to scale estimates for 2008–2015 lie within the narrow
band of 1.19–1.21 and in each case are significantly differ-
ent from 1 at the 0.1% level. This suggests for the sample
average bank that the same proportionate increase in
inputs in both sample periods would lead to a much big-
ger increase in bank size in the latter period. The princi-
pal reason why we observe larger increasing returns for
our second sample period is because for each model spec-
ification the coefficient on total securities (y2) is lower for
the 2008–2015 period than 1992–2007.
The first-order time trend parameters from the three
model specifications for the 1992–2007 sample period are
all positive. These time trend parameters are of the order
0.005–0.007 and are all significant at the 0.1% level. For
the sample average bank, this suggests that, on average,
the IDF shifts up annually by at least 0.5% due to techni-
cal progress. A positive estimate of the first-order time
trend parameter is in line with our expectations and sug-
gests that in this respect 1992–2007 is a typical type of
period. This is because annual technical progress is in
line with the prediction from production theory and is
consistent with technical innovations in the U.S. banking
industry during this period, such as further formats for
debit card transactions, the introduction of online bank-
ing and asset securitization (Frame & White, 2010;
Llewellyn, 2009).
The first-order time trend parameters from the three
model specifications for the 2008–2015 sample period
range from −0.007 − (−0.005) and are all significant at
the 0.1% level. These negative estimates are at odds with
production theory and inconsistent with technical inno-
vations in the industry over this period. Such innovations
include enhanced automated credit scoring and more
widespread use of fintech technologies, for example, the
application of artificial intelligence and machine learning
in lending activities for marketing and account monitor-
ing purposes (Frame, Wall, & White, 2018;
Thakor, 2019). In this respect, these estimates suggest
that 2008–2015 is an atypical period, which of course is
particularly true for the first portion of this period. For
2008–2015, we posit that we obtain negative first-order
time trend parameters because the negative effect of the
deepening of the financial crisis on technical change
more than offset the positive effect of the technical inno-
vations during this period.
We conclude our discussion of the fitted models by
focusing on the salient results for the z variables. With
the exception of the bank asset market share (MS) vari-
able, for each model specification, the signs of the coeffi-
cients on the z variables that have a large and significant
effect remain unchanged between the two sample
periods. Recall that the dependent variable for all the
fitted models is the negative logged labour input (−x1).
For all three-model specifications the MS variable
switches from having a large negative effect on the labour
input over the period 1992–2007 to having a large posi-
tive effect in the 2008–2015 sample. Although it is clear
from Figure 1 that the financial crisis is associated with
changes in the levels of some deposit types, we do not
attribute the change in the effect of MS on the labour
input to the crisis. Instead, we posit that the different
effects of MS in our two sample periods reflect the declin-
ing role of labour in U.S. bank production over time. This
is because in our latter sample period electronic banking
is much more prominent and following an increase in a
bank's MS it would be better placed to fund investment
in electronic banking and, as a result, reduce its labour
input. In contrast, during our earlier sample period
labour had a bigger role in bank production and follow-
ing an increase in a bank's MS it would be in a better
position to finance expansion by increasing its labour
input.
5.3 | Discussion of deposit type
substitution and complementarity
For model specifications 1–3 for the periods 1992–2007
and 2008–2015, we compute at the sample mean from
our fitted IDFs the six elasticities of substitution and
complementarity we presented in Section 4 (AEC; SEC;
MEC; AES; SES; MES). For pairs of deposit types these
six elasticities are presented in Tables 5–7 and for the
elasticities of complementarity we compute the SEs using
the delta method.10
As the theoretical literature on elasticities of substitu-
tion and complementarity is made up of a series of elas-
ticities that measure different relationships, we adopt a
logical two-part structure for our discussion that is based
on a systematic two-stage bank decision-making process
on deposit type substitution/complementarity. In the first
part, we discuss, in particular, our findings for the AEC
and AES, as well as our MEC and MES results. We dis-
cuss these elasticity results in the first part because they
can be used in the first stage of the bank decision-making
process to inform which deposits are substitutes/
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complements. Moreover, in the first part of the discussion
we place the emphasis on the AEC (and AES) results to
indicate if two deposit types are q substitutes/comple-
ments (p substitutes/complements). This is because,
although the MES and the MEC are appealing because
they are asymmetric, as Stern (2011) notes, when the pro-
duction technology is characterized by more than two
inputs, the MEC (MES) should not be used to classify if
two inputs are q substitutes/complements (p substitutes/
complements).11 In all three of our model specifications,
there are more than two deposit types, which is why the
AEC and AES are more relevant to our empirical setting.
Given a bank's knowledge from the first stage of the
decision-making process, the second stage of this process
relates to how viable it is to substitute between deposit
types. In the second part of the discussion, we therefore
provide some analysis of our SEC and SES results, as
these elasticities measure the degree of difficulty of input
substitution/complementarity. Given the paucity of stud-
ies that consider elasticities of substitution/complemen-
tarity of deposit types, we place the emphasis on the first
part of our discussion, which informs the first stage of
the decision-making process, as this is the logical
approach to develop further this small body of literature.
Table 5 reveals for the period before the crisis and the
period covering the crisis and beyond that the AECs for
each pair of deposit types from model specification 1 are
positive and significant at the 1% level or lower
(i.e., pairwise combinations of transaction accounts, non-
transaction accounts, and other transaction and other
non-transaction accounts [D1-D3, respectively]). This
indicates that each pair of deposit types in this model
specification are significant q complements in both sam-
ple periods. The implication is that the small changes we
observe in panel A of Figure 1 in the levels of these
deposit types in the period covering the crisis and beyond
were not sufficient to change the q complements classifi-
cation for pairs of these deposit types. These small
changes in deposit levels are the temporary drop in trans-
action accounts due to the crisis, and over the crisis
period and beyond the flatlining of non-transaction
accounts and the slow rise in other transaction and other
non-transaction accounts.
In contrast to our results from model specification
1, from model specification 2, there are some cases where
the q substitutes/complements results differ between the
two sample periods. Table 6 reports three such findings.
(i) The AECs for savings deposits (D2) and other deposits
(D3) for 1992–2007 and 2008–2015 are significant at the
0.1% level and indicate q complementarity and
q substitutability, respectively. (ii) The time deposits
(D1) and D3 AECs for the two sample periods have dif-
ferent signs, but neither is significant. (iii) The D1 and
D2 AECs for the two sample periods are positive and sig-
nificant indicating q complementarity, but whereas the
AEC for 1992–2007 is significant at the 0.1% level, it is
only significant at the 5% level for 2008–2015. Of these
three findings, the most noteworthy is (i) and to a lesser
extent (iii). Finding (i) is in line with the divergence of
savings deposits and other deposits that we observe from
2008 onwards in panel B of Figure 1. This is due over this
period to the steeper upward trend in savings deposits
and a fairly constant level of other deposits. Finding
(iii) is consistent with the change in the relationship
between time deposits and savings deposits that we
observe from 2008 onwards in panel B of Figure 1. This is
due to from 2008 the steady declining trend in time
deposits and the steeper upward trend in saving deposits.
Whether the trends in these two deposit types from 2008
have continued beyond the end of our study period and
have led to these deposits becoming q substitutes is an
area for future research.
Interestingly, for the only pair of deposit types in
model specification 3 (non-interest-bearing and interest-
bearing deposits), it is evident from Table 7 that the AEC
for 1992–2007 is close to zero and not significant,
whereas for 2008–2015 it is negative and significant at
the 0.1% level indicating that these deposits types are
q substitutes. This change in the relationship between
these deposit types is consistent with the changes from
2008 onwards in the levels of these deposits in panel C of
Figure 1. To illustrate, non-interest-bearing deposits go
from being fairly constant up to 2008 to being on a clear
downward trend from thereon, whereas interest-bearing
deposits, following some crisis-induced fluctuations,
revert to a path that resembles a continuation of its
steady pre-crisis upward trend. In terms of the economic
intuition that may explain these changes in the levels of
these deposit types and why for 2008–2015 they are
q substitutes, it may be because in the uncertain times
during the crisis and beyond, depositors had a greater
preference for liquid non-interest-bearing deposits over
more illiquid interest-bearing accounts.
Frondel and Schmidt (2002) note that when the MES
is incorrectly applied to cases where there are more than
two inputs, the MES tends to classify inputs as
p substitutes because the own input price elasticity tends
to be greater in absolute value than the cross price elas-
ticities. In line with this, we find that the MES is positive
for every pair of deposit types, but there is no evidence to
suggest that this classification of each pair of deposit
types as p substitutes is erroneous because all the AESs
in Tables 5–7 are also positive. Applying this to the case
of the MEC from an IDF, from the duality of cost and
input distance functions, when there are more than two
inputs we should observe that the MEC from an IDF
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tends to classify inputs as q complements. Our results
exclusively support this because for every pair of deposit
types we find that the MEC is positive. In contrast to our
MES and AES results, however, this does lead to some
cases where the MEC would appear to incorrectly classify
two deposit types as q complements, while the AEC indi-
cates that they are q substitutes. For example, as we
noted above for savings deposits and other deposits for
2008–2015, the significant AEC indicates that these
deposit types are q substitutes.
Having discussed the q and p substitutes/comple-
ments classifications of pairs of deposit types, we now
focus on the changes in the magnitudes of the elasticities
between the two sample periods. To this end, in Figures 4
and 5 we present for the two sample periods radar dia-
grams for the elasticities for model specifications 1 and
2.12 In these figures, the blue radars relate to the elastici-
ties for 1992–2007 and the red radars relate to the elastici-
ties for 2008–2015. From Figure 4, we can see for model
specification 1 that the AEC (AES) for each pair of
deposit types is larger (smaller) in magnitude for
1992–2007, vis-à-vis 2008–2015. This is also the case for
model specification 2, with the exception of the AEC and
AES for time deposits and other deposits. Consistent with
these results for time deposits and other deposits, for
model specification 3 we can see from Table 7 that the
AEC (AES) for interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing
deposits is smaller (larger) for 1992–2007 than we observe
for 2008–2015.
Building on Figures 4 and 5, in Table 8 we report z-
scores for pairwise one-tailed tests of elasticities of comple-
mentarity from a 2008–2015 model against the
corresponding elasticity from the 1992–2007 model. For an
AEC that is larger or smaller for 2008–2015 than we observe
for 1992–2007, Table 8 reveals that it is significantly larger
or smaller at the 5% level or lower, with the exception of
one AEC from model specification 1 (between transaction
accounts and other transaction and other non-transaction
accounts). For example, the AEC from model specification
2 for time deposits and savings deposits for 1992–2007 is sig-
nificantly larger than for 2008–2015. This indicates that,
although these two deposit types are significant
q complements in both sample periods, the degree of
q complementarity is significantly less in the latter period.
This finding is consistent with the change in the relation-
ship between time deposits and savings deposits that we
observed above from 2008 onwards due to the steady
declining trend in time deposits and the steeper upward
trend in savings deposits.
We have discussed how the elasticities we have
analysed thus far can inform the first stage of a bank
decision-making process on deposit type substitution/
complementarity by indicating whether each pair of
deposit types are q and p substitutes/complements. Given
the bank's knowledge from the first stage of this decision-
making process, in the second stage of the process it is
perfectly reasonable for banks to consider the degree of
difficulty of substitution/complementarity between a pair
of deposit types. The degree of difficulty associated with
q and p substitution/complementarity between a pair of
deposit types relates to the magnitudes of the SEC and
SES, respectively. Tables 5–7 indicate for every pair of
deposit types for both sample periods that the SEC is pos-
itive, as theory requires, less than 1 and significant at the
0.1% level. As all the SECs are less than 1 this suggests
that there are limited q substitution/complementarity
possibilities between the pairs of deposit types. For every
pair of deposit types for both sample periods, Tables 5–7
also reveal that the SES is positive and greater than
1, which indicates that there is plenty of scope for
p substitution/complementarity.
We would expect there to be plenty of scope for
p substitution/complementarity between a pair of deposit types
because the relationship between the price of a deposit type,
which is the rate of interest that a bank pays on the deposit
account, and the quantity of the deposit is well defined from
microeconomic theory. The quantity of a deposit type will there-
fore be sensitive to a change in its price. It is in turn reasonable
to think that the quantity of a deposit type will be sensitive to a
change in the price of another deposit type. In contrast, it is not
surprising we find that there is limited q substitution/comple-
mentarity possibilities between the pairs of deposit types
because a change in the quantity of a deposit type may not
change the deposit type's marginal product and the marginal
products of other deposit types. The reason is because if, for
example, the quantity of a deposit type increases at a bank, it
does not necessarily follow that this will lead to an increase in
one or more of the bank's outputs (e.g., loans), and that it will
also impact the relationships between the bank's other deposit
types and its outputs. The bank may not use the increase in this
input to increase its outputs and could put the increase in the
input to an alternative use to aid its financial condition, for
example, increase its reserves at the Fed. We expand on this fur-
ther in the next section where we conclude by putting into con-
text some of our salient findings on deposit type substitution
and complementarity by describing some general banking situa-
tions that fit with such findings.
6 | CONTEXTUAL SUMMARY OF
THE SALIENT EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS
Figure 1 suggests that the relationships between the
levels of some deposit types differ between the pre-crisis
period and the period covering the crisis and beyond. The
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approach we adopt in this paper to quantify any crisis-
induced changes in the relationships between pairs of
deposit types is to analyse if there has been changes in
their substitutability/complementarity. It is useful for
banks to have such information because deposits are
banks' principal source of funding for their lending activi-
ties. To indicate how such information may feature in a
bank's decision-making, we suggest a logical two-stage
bank decision-making process on deposit type substitu-
tion/complementarity. In the first stage, we suggest that
banks may consider whether pairs of deposit types are
q and p substitutes/complements. Given this knowledge
from the first stage, in the second stage of the process we
suggest that banks may consider the degree of difficulty
of q and p substitution/complementarity between pairs of
deposit types. The two key general findings from our
empirical analysis on the substitutability/complementar-
ity of pairs of deposit types in the context of banking situ-
ations that fit with these findings are as follows.
1. We only find some evidence, rather than widespread
evidence, of changes in the q substitutes/complements
classifications of pairs of deposit types between the
pre-crisis period and the period covering the crisis and
beyond. Given the crisis was a watershed for the
U.S. banking industry, this evidence suggests that the
q substitutes/complements classification of a pair of
deposits types may only change in response to a major
development in the industry. Since such developments
do not occur regularly, the changes in the
q substitutes/complements classifications we dis-
cussed in the previous section are likely to represent
long-term changes in depositors' preferences between
deposit types.
2. In the final point in the previous section, we noted
that it is not surprising we find that there are limited
q substitution/complementarity possibilities between
the pairs of deposit types. This is because a change in
the quantity of a deposit type may not change its own
marginal product and the marginal products of other
deposit types. One reason we gave for this was that if,
for example, the quantity of a deposit type increases at
a bank, the bank may not choose to use the increase
in this input to increase its outputs. It may instead put
the increase in the input to an alternative use to aid
its financial condition by increasing its capital.
Another reason why we may observe limited
q substitution/complementarity possibilities between
pairs of deposit types is because a change in the quan-
tity of a deposit type at a bank may not be sufficient
on its own to change its impact, and the impacts of
other deposit types, on the levels of the bank's aggre-
gate outputs in our models. Instead a bank may use
the aggregate level of its deposits, as opposed to the
levels of deposit categories, to inform decisions
about the aggregate levels of its outputs. If this is
the case, it raises the issue why we find that a num-
ber of pairs of deposit types are q complements in
one or both sample periods (e.g., transaction
accounts and non-transaction accounts in both sam-
ple periods). We suggest it is because changes in
economic conditions may have a similar impact on
a pair of deposit types, as opposed to the deposit
types being directly related to one another. Even if a
pair of deposit types is indirectly related, the infor-
mation that our analysis provides on which pairs of
deposit types are q complements can be useful to
banks in the strategic management of their deposit
portfolios.
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ENDNOTES
1 These data are available from the FDIC and is provided in the
Reports of Condition and Income (i.e., Call Reports) that
U.S. banks are required to complete.
2 Moreover, all the elasticities of substitution and complementarity
we compute are net elasticities because they are net of an output
quantity change as output is held constant. In contrast, gross elas-
ticities measure input substitution/complementarity when the
output level is permitted to change.
3 An increase in a q substitute (complement) reduces (increases)
the marginal product of the other substitutable (complementary)
input. Two inputs are p substitutes (complements) if, when the
price of one input rises, the quantity of the other increases
(decreases).
4 The federal funds effective rate is the weighted average of the
overnight rates that depository institutions (banks and credit
unions) negotiate with one another, when those with surplus
reserve balances at the Fed lend on an uncollateralized basis to
those that need larger balances.
5 The data for Figure 3 is available from the FDIC and is provided
in the Call Reports.
6 The dates of these phases of U.S. business cycles are from the
National Bureau of Economic Research (https://www.nber.org/
cycles.html).
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7 Kim (2000) attributes the AEC to Antonelli (1886) as it involves
using the Antonelli substitution matrix, which is the matrix of
second order partial derivatives of a distance function
(Deaton, 1979).
8 With such large data sets for our sample periods and the large
number of variables in each model, even when we only estimate
random slopes for the first-order deposit types estimating a single
model can take up to 4 hr.
9 Specifically, the three Wald tests clearly reject the null as the χ2
test statistics are extremely large as they range from 12,106 to
17,124.
10 The matrix inversion to compute the AES from the AEC [see
Equation (11)] precludes calculating the standard error of the
AES using the delta method. This is also the case for the SES and
the MES as they are calculated from the AES. This could be
addressed by computing the standard errors for the dual elastici-
ties of substitution by bootstrapping, although this is outside the
scope of this paper.
11 We still report the MEC and MES estimates for two reasons.
First, to demonstrate how they should be calculated in the two
input case. Second, to appreciate any differences in the results on
deposit type substitution/complementarity when using the more
appropriate AEC and AES for our case with more than two
inputs.
12 We suggest that radar diagrams of elasticities of substitution and
complementarity are particularly useful to compare several elas-
ticity estimates. Model specification 3 comprises just two deposit
types which is insufficient to construct a radar diagram of the
deposit elasticities. In this situation it is simple to compare the
elasticities by eyeballing the estimates.
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